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It is often argued that national referendums on  European Union (EU) matters 
can be a cure for the democratic deficit of the   EU and its policies. But what can 
we learn from a country like Switzerland   about how and when direct democracy 
works? In this blog post, Eva Thomann, Isabelle Stadelmann-Steffen, and Eva G. 
Heidbreder conclude that referendums in the EU usually lack the   necessary in-
stitutional and administrative links between direct and representative   decision-
making to have legitimacy-enhancing effects. 
 
Today, many perceive the European Union (EU) as lacking in democratic legitimacy. Euroscepticism 
is on the rise, driven, in part, by the notion that the EU’s electoral and policymaking processes are 
opaque and distant from national concerns. Some of these perceptions are demonstrably wrong. 
Still, political leaders in the EU and its member states are aware of this issue and seek ways to 
reduce their distance to “the people”. One solution - intensely discussed - is that of national refer-
endums on matters of EU-wide relevance, namely national decisions on membership, treaty ratifi-
cation and specific policy issues. Examples include the round of referendums on the Constitutional 
Treaty in 2005 in France, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg; the 2016 Hungarian migrant quota 
referendum; and the infamous Brexit vote in the United Kingdom in 2016. 
 
More legitimate decisions? 
The intention behind holding direct-democratic votes is often to reach a more legitimate political 
decision: referendums integrate voters in the decision-making process, and the resulting decisions 
should enjoy higher levels of acceptance among the voters. People who make this argument often 
refer to the Swiss political system with its direct democratic elements. In fact, a vast majority of 
European citizens think that referendums are important for democracy. However, experiences like 
the Brexit referendum raise significant concerns as to whether national referendums on EU matters 
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lead to more legitimate democratic decisions: the Brexit vote has had a severe and long-lasting ef-
fect of politicising and polarising the British voters. It has also raised a host of questions about the 
rightful place of this vote in the constitutional order of the UK; some argue it has at best an indicative 
character, whilst others reject any alternative to Brexit as unconstitutional. 
 
Having reviewed the extensive research on Swiss direct democracy, we argue that three key lessons 
can be learned from the Swiss case. 
 
Institutions matter 
Everything we know about why direct democracy works in the Swiss political system suggests that 
the direct democracy in Switzerland functions well because the direct democratic instruments are 
embedded in other political institutions. In Switzerland, popular votes are an integral part of the 
regular policy-making process. Such votes are either constitutionally mandatory or generated by 
bottom-up forces, that is, by voters collecting a sufficient number of signatures. Moreover, Swiss 
institutions have a host of safeguards to prevent popular votes from becoming a “tyranny of the 
majority”. Political decision-making processes are consensual, meaning that different interests, 
namely the parties, interest groups, the cantons, and the people have their specific role in this pro-
cess. Switzerland’s federalist structures (the so-called Ständemehr) ensure that the interests of 
both member states, that is, the cantons, and citizens are equally represented by balancing the rep-
resentation of the cantons with the direct representation of the people.  
 
Finally, it is important to note that the direct democratic decision is never the final policy-making 
step. There is actually an – often contested – tendency to adapt unpopular or extreme decisions in 
the implementation process, that is, to make these decisions more moderate or consensual. All 
these safeguards serve the same goal: integrating a variety of actors and interests into the decision-
making process in order to reach a consensual solution.  
 
In the context of EU member states, these safeguards are by-and-large missing. In EU member 
states, referendums are typically once-in-a-lifetime votes with an unclear legal status, often lead-
ing to fierce contestation. Many national referendums on EU matters are launched by political lead-
ers guided by political, power-related motives. In addition, since referendums on EU matters can 
only be held on the national level, each EU-related vote is cast by only a fraction of the EU-citizens, 
despite its results affecting citizens of other EU states who have no voting influence whatsoever. 
Given that these expressions of direct democracy are currently so dissimilar to Switzerland’s sys-
tem, can we really expect them to have similar effects in EU member states? We do not think so. 
When referendums are highly exceptional events and lack a clear institutional embedding that in-
tegrates as many affected as possible, they generate uncertainty. Voters are not only uncertain 
about the outcomes of the vote, they are even unsure about what the government will do with the 
result. This makes a legitimacy-enhancing effect of referendums not only unlikely; it can invert their 
intended effect.  
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Polity must match constituency 
If a referendum on an EU policy is held in an EU state, there is an obvious mismatch between the 
people that vote – that is the people of that country –, and the set of countries, institutions, and 
people who are affected by the vote. National referendums on EU matters typically have EU-wide 
implications, even though a large share of those affected are unable to have their say. As the 2016 
Hungarian migrant quota referendum has illustrated, even when national referendums appear to 
concern mainly national issues, they can conflict with the distribution of policy competences be-
tween the EU and member states. 
 
Also in Switzerland, the problem of non-matching constituencies exists. In Eurosceptic Switzerland, 
direct democratic decisions that go against international treaties and obligations are also repeatedly 
put to vote, sometimes resulting in contradictory democratic decisions with a constitutional or in-
ternationally binding character. It is difficult to design stringent rules of the game that deal with 
such contradictions. In the end, such contradictions challenge the sensitive balance between direct 
and representative democracy. In Switzerland, such conflicts are sometimes revealed by courts af-
ter the vote by declaring a conflict with international law; however, the Swiss constitution does not 
establish a clear hierarchy between international law and Swiss constitutional law and Switzerland 
does not have a constitutional court, which makes it impossible to resolve these conflicts through 
courts. Before the vote, the federal parliament can declare an initiative invalid only if it violates for-
mal rules or the peremptory norms of international law—this happened only 4 times in history. 
Another, more frequent strategy is, interestingly, to only partially or de facto not implement the 
popular decision. In other words, while proponents of national referendums on EU matters promote 
the direct execution of the citizens’ will as the positive example, in Switzerland representative, ex-
ecutive, and judicial institutions often mitigate or even “correct” the citizens’ vote.  
 
 
The voter side: voting under uncertainty 
The outcomes of referendum votes are often difficult to predict and sometimes voting days produce 
“surprises”. This also pertains to the debate about whether voters are capable of making informed 
decisions on important issues at all. While some argue that this is actually the case, others empha-
size that direct democratic decisions are prone to (emotional) campaign effects and biased infor-
mation processing. For the case of Switzerland, empirical evidence for both perspectives can be 
found: voters are often able to justify their decisions, but at the same time, campaign dynamics can 
influence the vote outcome. Thus, even in Switzerland with direct democracy being deeply embed-
ded in the political process and with voters having extensive experience in making up their mind on 
policy issues, referendum outcomes are sometimes uncertain or surprising.  
 
We argue that the likelihood for unpredictable and surprising results only increases in national ref-
erendums on EU matters. One reason is the above-mentioned uncertainty related to the lack of 
institutional embedding. Another reason is related to voters’ behaviour, which might be much more 
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volatile if direct democratic decisions are rare events, therefore triggering many different mecha-
nisms beyond the decision as such. Third, the motives for initiating referendums in a national con-
text are often also strongly “internal” national concerns, even though the questions put to vote are 
EU-wide issues. This mismatch affects both campaigning and the handling of the results. We ques-
tion whether this inherent uncertainty is conducive to the legitimacy of the political process. 
 
Direct democracy is not a simple fix 
Overall, we conclude that national referendums on EU matters are unlikely to have legitimacy-en-
hancing effects given the current institutional setting. Instead, they are likely to enhance the polar-
isation and the politicisation of support for and resentment against the EU. The frequently men-
tioned success of direct democracy in Switzerland is strongly related to the fact that direct democ-
racy is one inherent element of a political system that also includes consensual decision-making, 
double majority requirements and extensive implementation processes. This does not make Swit-
zerland a better but a different democracy, with its specific strengths and weaknesses. 
 
While national referendums on EU matters ought to improve the democratic quality of EU decision-
making, they actually may have the opposite effect. EU referendums, whether at the national level 
or even if made possible at the EU level, in most EU states lack the necessary institutional and ad-
ministrative links between direct and representative decision-making. Direct democracy is not just 
an add-on to parliamentary democracy. To enhance democratic legitimacy, it needs to be carefully 
crafted as part of representative democracies. 
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